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‘New Labour’s’  Manifesto (Lab-
our Party, ) has a whole chapter
dedicated to ‘A Modern Welfare State’.
The chapter outlines the policies it
introduced in its ﬁrst term and pledges
for the next term aimed at promoting
‘work for those who can and security
for those who can’t’ (ibid., p. ). For
people of working age these policies
include the various ‘new deals’, Working
Families Tax Credit () (the beneﬁt
paid to low paid and/or part time
workers), the National Childcare Stra-
tegy () and the National Minimum
Wage (). These policies are more
concerned with the project of
‘promoting work’ for those of working
age. Little is said of how the working
age able-bodied can expect security if
they cannot work for whatever reason.
The promotion of paid employment has
come to dominant ‘new Labour’s’
welfare reform programme because it is
This paper locates ‘new Labour’s’ welfare reform agenda inthe workfarist shift of recent social policy. In this contextit explores the aim of ‘new labour’s’ welfare reform prog-
ramme to reconstitute the reserve army of labour so that it is
able to fulfil its role in managing economic stability. The emphasis
is upon ensuring that labour is as cheap as possible for capital to
employ through various direct and indirect wage subsidies and
requiring more benefit dependent groups to compete for paid
employment.
held to be the ‘best anti-poverty, anti-
crime and pro-family policy yet’ (ibid.).
This paper examines the centrality
of paid work to ‘new Labour’s’ welfare
reform programme, arguing that the
programme aims to re-regulate the
reserve army of labour to increase its
size and increase its closeness to labour
markets by making it more ‘employable’.
In this context ‘employable’ actually
means making labour cheaper to hire
through the direct and indirect subsidy
of wages. It is demonstrated how ‘new
Labour’s’ approach diﬀers to that of the
Conservatives under whom the reserve
army eﬀect arguably lost its importance
as non-employed people (unemployed,
lone mothers and sick and disabled
people) became detached long term
from labour markets.
‘New Labour’ and ‘workfarism’
There is debate about the balance
between continuity and change in the
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labour market and income maintenance
policies of the Conservatives and those
of ‘new Labour’. ‘Supply-side funda-
mentalism’ (Peck and Theodore, ,
p. )—a focus upon the characteris-
tics and behaviour of non-employed
people in causing unemployment rather
the (lack of) demand for labour—
provides an important source of conti-
nuity. The main source of discontinuity
is argued to be the substantial resources
that ‘new Labour’ have invested in their
ﬂagship policies, most notably the new
deals and the support that the new deals
give in helping non-employed people
prepare for work (see Peck, ).
‘New Labour’s’ welfare reform
programme has recently been described
as being part of a ‘workfarist’ shift in
Britain (Peck, , Peck and Theodore,
). The way the term ‘workfare’ is
used in this sense diﬀers from its trad-
itional association with forcing claimants
to work in return for their beneﬁts. In
contrast, ‘workfarism’ represents a re-
orientation of social policy to make it
more ‘in tune’ with neo-liberal growth,
for example, the facilitation of ﬂexible
labour markets through social policy in
the pursuit of a competitive edge in
global markets. In this sense social
policy has become central to economic
restructuring aimed at supporting ‘free’
markets, rather than being concerned
with protecting universal rights that were
associated with Keynesianism.
The trends towards a ‘workfarist’
state were visible towards the end of the
Conservative’s eighteen year reign. In
the s, for example, Peck and Theo-
dore (, p. ) observe the emer-
gence of what they call a ‘new orthodoxy
in labour-market policy’ involving ‘both
incentives and pressures to work in the
context of a laissez-faire approach to the
demand side of the labour market’.
Under ‘new Labour’ this orthodoxy has
been consolidated through more
generous and wider-scoped work incen-
tives (‘tax credits’ and the ) and
beneﬁt penalties that can now be
invoked to punish those oﬃcially deﬁned
as ‘unemployed’ and also lone mothers
and sick and disabled people who do not
explore with the relevant government
agencies the possibilities for securing
paid employment. However, as Peck
(, p. ) notes in the case of unem-
ployed people, ‘the bitter pill of manda-
tory participation has been sugared
under the New Deal by the twin emphases
placed on quality programming and
participant choice’.
Here we are not so much concerned
with the detail of the welfare reforms in
the shift to ‘workfarism’, but with the
ways in which the reforms are aimed at
reconstituting the reserve army so that
it is able to fulﬁl its role in managing
economic stability.
‘New Labour’, the reserve army and
welfare reform
‘New Labour’ has made it clear that it
aims to guide Britain away from the
‘boom and bust’ economy of the post-
Second World War period towards
stable economic growth. The most im-
portant means of ensuring stable growth
‘new Labour’ argues is through the
control of inﬂation. An important means
of controlling inﬂation is to ensure that
an eﬀective reserve army of labour
exists. The ‘new Labour’-favoured
economist Professor (now Lord) Layard
(a, p. ) outlines the argument:
In any economy there has to be some
short-term unemployment to ease
mobility and restrain wage pressure
by providing employers with a pool
of workers able to ﬁll vacancies. But
long-term unemployment appears to
be largely useless as it exerts very little
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downward pressure on inﬂation. This
is because employers are generally
unenthusiastic about long-term
unemployed people as potential ﬁllers
of vacancies. Whether this reaction
is justiﬁed (by the demoralization and
deskilling of the workers) or not
justiﬁed is unimportant.
Although Layard does not use a Marxian
discourse, he is essentially describing the
role Marx assigned to the reserve army
of labour some  years ago. According
to Layard the reserve army has little
deﬂationary eﬀect if it is made up of long
term unemployed people because emp-
loyers see them as lacking as potential
employees. Employers may not just have
this view of those oﬃcially deﬁned as
‘unemployed’. Similar observations
could be made of other groups who may
be long term absent from labour mar
kets, such as some lone mothers and sick
and disabled people. Such a situation of
long term unemployment and ‘beneﬁt
dependency’ developed under the Con-
servatives, particularly in the s. This
gave the impression that non-employed
people were not so much a reserve army
of labour, but more a population perma-
nently excluded from paid work and
labour markets (c.f. Bauman, ).
In Layard’s line of thinking there are
two pre-requisites for deﬂationary pres-
sures upon wage levels. First, there must
always be a reserve army of labour, no
matter what form the accumulation
regime takes. Second, the reserve army
must have a close relationship to labour
markets. Hence Layard’s focus upon
the beneﬁts to capital of short term
unemployment and the uselessness of
long term unemployment. His argu-
ments raise important questions about
the relationship between ‘welfare’ poli-
cy and economic performance, for the
former regulates the position of the
reserve army in relation to the latter.
One of the most important roles of ‘wel-
fare’ policy is to maintain and regulate
the reserve army to ensure that it has a
close relationship to labour markets so
that it can fulﬁl its role in the management
of economic stability.
There is much evidence to suggest
that ‘new Labour’ is aware of such
necessities. Ministers make much of the
close relationship between ‘welfare’ and
economic policy, and through closely
aligning the two, it is believed that non-
inﬂationary growth can be sustained,
even with greater numbers of people in
employment. As the Chancellor of the
Exchequer has commented:
The more our welfare to work
reforms allow the long-term unemp-
loyed to re-enter the active labour
market, the more it will possible to
reduce unemployment without
increasing inﬂationary pressures.
(Brown, , p. )
This is because the:
welfare-to-work programme makes
the labour market ﬂexible… It creates
greater ﬂexibility by breaking down
the barriers that trap people in long-
term unemployment. It increases the
supply of labour in the economy, its
quality and its employability. (Peter
Mandelson, then Secretary of State
for Trade and Industry, in Hansard,
, col. )
According to Mandelson ‘new Labour’s’
welfare reform package helps create and
maintain the ﬂexibilities that ‘new
labour’s’ particular brand of neo-
liberalism requires to ﬂourish (see
Grover and Stewart, , chapter ).
In this context how does ‘new Labour’s’
welfare reform programme help met the
two pre-requisites Layard outlines to
maintain downward wage pressures
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through the eﬀects of the reserve army?
First, it is aimed at swelling the numbers
within the reserve army. In addition to
those oﬃcially deﬁned as ‘unemployed’,
‘new Labour’ have attempted to draw
into the reserve army groups that in the
past have not been expected to be
actively engaged with labour markets,
most notably lone mothers, the partners
of unemployed people and, increasingly,
sick and disabled people. Each of these
groups are subject to ‘new deals’ that
operate in addition to those for people
oﬃcially deﬁned as ‘unemployed’.
This is important because the greater
the size of the reserve army the greater
potential for controlling inﬂation at
entry level wages. Competition is held
to be the key to maintaining downward
pressure on wages. The larger the
reserve army is the greater potential
there is for competition.
In attempting to draw more groups
into the reserve army ‘new Labour’ are
taking policy in a direction that the Con-
servatives were, on the whole, unwilling
to go. Pressure to take paid work was
until recently really only placed upon
those oﬃcially deﬁned as unemployed.
So, for example, due to ideological
prescriptions concerning the role of
women as mothers the Conservatives
placed little pressure upon lone mothers
to take paid work. ‘New Labour’ has
gone to the other extreme. Lone
mothers, for example, are now deﬁned
as unemployed labour rather than
important actors in social reproduction
(Borrie, ).
However, the eﬀectiveness of the
reserve army is not just linked to its size.
To be competitive individuals must also
have characteristics that capital desires.
This links to a second issue of the
closeness of the relationship between
the reserve army and labour markets.
The way in which ‘new Labour’ aims to
increase the closeness of the relation-
ship between the reserve army is
through what is called ‘employability’.
If the reserve army is ‘employable’ its
deﬂationary eﬀect will be heightened:
if people are not employable they are
not going to exert this disﬂationary
force which is the thing which leads
to the possibility of expansion. But,
if we can increase the number of
people who are employable to start
with, we will have more people out
there facing employers looking for
work who are employable and that
will lead to a disﬂationary force.
Employers will not feel compelled to
bid up wages in order to deal with
shortages and that will enable the
authorities to let demand expand
safely. (Layard, in Education and
Employment Committee, ,
question )
‘Employability’ is ‘the new buzzword in
labour-market policy circles’ (Peck and
Theodore, , p. ). But what does
it actually mean? Usually the focus is
upon the character and characteristics
of non-employed people, for example
their attitudes to paid employment or
the ‘skills’ and experience that they may
or may not have. However, this deﬂects
attention from the fact that ‘employa-
bility’ is actually about the wage costs of
capital. As Margaret Thatcher pointed
out to unemployed people in the s
the bottom line is that it is the cost of
their labour that makes potential
workers ‘employable’.
It is no coincidence that what we see
in ‘new Labour’s’ welfare reform
package is a concerted eﬀort to increase
the closeness of the relationship bet-
ween the reserve army and labour markets
by making it as cheap as possible to
employ. This has involved the direct
subsidisation of the wage costs of
capital, for example, through the pay-
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ment of allowances for capitalists
employing those on the new deal prog-
rammes for unemployed people. Such
subsidies mean:
employers are now being faced with
a much increased supply of workers
that they ﬁnd attractive. Previously,
they [employers] had a certain ﬂow
of people from whom they could try
and ﬁll their empty slots and they
disregarded the long term unemp-
loyed… Now they faced with long
term unemployed people who are
more attractive to them and this
means that it is a greater supply of
labour, there is disﬂationary
pressure in the economy... (Layard
in evidence to the Employment Com-
mittee, , question )
Layard is conﬁrming that ‘employability’
is not so much about the characteristics
of non-employed people but is about
how much they cost to employ. At entry
level non-employed people have to be
as cheap as possible to be attractive to
capital. The internal contradiction of the
capitalist system are clear here, for while
capital may want cheap labour, it is not
necessarily in the interests of the reserve
army (given out-of-work beneﬁts) to
take such low paid employment. There-
fore, to ensure the policy of directly
subsidising wage costs has the desired
eﬀect upon wages costs participation by
unemployed people in the new deal
schemes has to be compulsory on the
threat of beneﬁt withdrawal.
A second way ‘new Labour’ is
attempting to make the reserve army
cheaper to employ is through the
payment of in-work beneﬁts (now re-
branded as ‘tax credits’) to those in low
paid employment. The Conservatives
developed in-work beneﬁts from the late
s. Their extension in generosity and
scope has been the main income
maintenance policy development of
‘new Labour’. The purpose of ‘new
Labour’s’ ‘tax credits’ is to reduce the
gross wage that individuals will work for
by increasing their net wage through in-
work relief. One idea behind this is to
once again increase the supply of labour.
Grover and Stewart (, p. ) quote
a senior civil servant to explain the argu-
ment:
What you are doing if you have in-
work beneﬁts is you are essentially
lowering the wage at which it
becomes ﬁnancially sensible to work.
So you are creating a situation where
more people want to work at any one
wage level because the work is
actually worth more to them.
Such moves are consistent with the
project to increase competition for
employment. However, the development
of subsidies for low paid employment
puts further downward pressure upon
wages by providing a state-sponsored
top-up for low paying employers. In
their second term ‘new Labour’ have
pledged that ‘tax credits’, currently only
available to those people with dependent
children, will be extended to all workers
aged  or over. For the ﬁrst time on a
national scale single people and childless
couples could be entitled to a supp-
lement if they receive low wages or work
part time. We are at an unprecedented
point in the history of income mainten-
ance policy when the majority of people
in paid employment of more than 
hours a week will be entitled to claim a
subsidy, providing their wage is low
enough.
There can be little doubt that this is
aimed at maintaining downward
pressure on wages. The Conservatives
tested a similar scheme, whereby every
worker in pilot areas could have recei-
ved an in-work top-up if their wages
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were low enough. In discussions about
this policy with senior civil servants
Grover and Stewart (, pp. -)
were told:
Civil servant: Well, I mean I have
been persuaded it won’t work unless
it has an eﬀect on wages. It depends
on how much of an eﬀect on wages.
CG: So... a... degree of eﬀect then,
would be acceptable?
Civil servant: The argument my
economist colleagues use is: since
there is no shortage at the bottom
end of the labour market, it is entirely
a demand thing. And the only way
you will increase demand is by
reducing the cost of labour to the
employer, and so unless it does drive
wages down a bit, nothing will happen
(emphasis added).
While the , if rigorously enforced,
should provide a ﬂoor below which
wages should not fall, it does not detract
from the fact that in the future there will
be little pressure upon capital to inc-
rease wages at the lower end of earnings
spectrum beyond what they are told to
do so by the state. In fact, the  is
crucial to the programme, for without it
the cost to the Treasury of ‘tax credits’
would be prohibitive. The fear is that
capital will lower its wages in the
knowledge that the state would meet the
diﬀerence between wages and the
political deﬁned minima (Layard,
b, p. ).
Conclusion
In this paper we have seen ‘new
Labour’s’ attempt to re-regulate the
reserve army so that it maintains its role
in providing stability in economic
growth. It has been argued that this is
linked to wider trends in what have been
described as ‘workfarist shifts’—an
attempt to change the nature of ‘welfare’
provision to make it more  congruent
with neo-liberal development.
Compared to the Conservative’s
approach this has involved both conti-
nuity and change. Continuity is visible
in the individualising of unemployment
through supply-side foci upon the
character and characteristics of the
non-employed. However, there are
important departures in the regulation
of the reserve army. Overall, ‘new
Labour’ has been far more active in pro-
moting the eﬀectiveness of the reserve
army. The Conservatives, particularly in
the s, were willing to let the reserve
army to be governed by what would now
be termed a ‘passive’ beneﬁt regime.
This changed somewhat in the s
with the development of the Jobseekers’
Allowance and has been extended by
‘new Labour’ who have increased the
authoritarian nature of the beneﬁt
regime through the new deals. The new
deals have also increased the size of the
reserve army by drawing in groups, most
notably lone mothers but also sick and
disabled, that previously faced little
pressure to ﬁnd work.
‘New Labour’ has also been willing
to subsidise the wages costs of capital to
a far greater extent than the Conserva-
tives were. These subsidies are aimed at
making the reserve army more ‘employ-
able’—more attractive to capital—by
reducing wage cost. The Conservatives
would not have entertained the level of
subsidies ‘new Labour’ have overseen
(c.f. Peck and Theodore, , p. ):
a high proportion of the £. billion for
the various new deals and an estimated
£. billion a year through , a ﬁgure
set to increase substantially with the
development of further ‘tax credits’ in
‘new Labour’s’ current term in oﬃce.
The reserve army is larger, more
disciplined and more highly subsidised
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than before. These developments are in
the name of securing the right conditions
for neo-liberal growth. In contrast to
the state withdrawing to free markets
from institutional constraints, neo-
liberalism, it would seem, requires inc-
reasing levels of discipline and expen-
diture to ensure that capital is not
starved of its most important asset; its
labour.
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